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I. INTRODUCTION

Labor unions ("employee organizations" or "unions") contend that where the
law requires them to represent all employees, including those who are not union
members, in a bargaining unit, nonmembers should have to pay their share of union
expenses! Negotiating and administering collective bargaining agreements and
representing employees in dispute and grievance settlements involve the
expenditure of considerable time and money by employee organizations. 2 Nonunion
employees who benefit from these union services without paying dues obtain a
"free ride." 3 To prevent these "free rides," unions seek agreements that require the
levying of mandatory dues on all employees who benefit from the union's services.4
Arrangements that require an employee either to join an employee organization
or to pay the organization a "fair share fee" as a condition of employment are
known as "agency shop arrangements." 5 Agency shop arrangements are one form
of organizational security device6 designed to strengthen employee organizations
and insure their financial stability Long recognized as valid when negotiated

1.
WorerPaycheck FairnessAct: Hearingson H.R. 1625 Before House Subcommittee on Employer and
Employee Relations, 105th Cong., at 5 (1998) (testimony of Morgan 0. Reynolds, Professor of Economics at
Texas A&M University) [hereinafter Reynolds Testimony].
2.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221 (1976).

3.

Id.
at222.

4. David B. Yelin, ConstitutionalConsiderationsAffecting the Methods of Exacting Union "Fair-Share"
Collective BargainingFeesfom Non-Member PublicEmployees, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 767,768 (1985).
5.
Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Union Security Arrangements in State PublicEmployment, 95 A.L.R.
3d 1102, 1106 (1980).
6.
Joseph G. Schumb, Jr., Agency Fees in Educational Employment: Reality or Mirage?, 18 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 909,909-12 (1979).
7.
Foster,supranote 5, at 1106. The various security devices can be arranged in ths order of decreasing

restrictiveness. Closed shops permit employment for union members only. Id. Union shops require an employee
to join a union shortly after being hired and to continuously maintain union membership. Id. Maintenance-ofmembership provisions require union members to maintain their union membership during the term of a collective
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between private sector employees and employers, most organizational security
devices have resulted in mixed legal results when used in the public sector.'

California law authorizes most local, State, and public education employees to
enter into agency shop arrangements. 9 However, under the Higher Education

Employee Relations Act (HEERA),'t the option to enter into agency shop
arrangements has not been available to employees of the University of California
(UC) and California State University (CSU) systems." In legislation unprecedented

in the public sector, Chapter 952 mandates agency shop arrangements for UC and2
CSU bargaining units for which an exclusive representative has been selected.'

Those employees who are not union members, yet benefit from union
representation, will be required to pay a "fair share service fee" to the union until
such a time that a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit vote to discontinue
the agency shop arrangement. 3
This Legislative Note will discuss the legal history of collective bargaining

rights in California public employment, consider the constitutional challenges to
agency shop arrangements, and examine California's current statutes related to

agency shop arrangements in public employment.14 A review of the essential
elements of Chapter 952 and an analysis of the issues raised by Chapter 952 is also
provided.'5 Finally, this Legislative Note suggests a rather extreme
solution for
6
those employees opposed to mandatory fair share service fees.'

bargaining agreement. Id. Agency shop or fair share agreements require every employee either to join the union
or to pay a service fee to the union as a condition of employment. Id. Checkoff privileges afford an option to
employees whereby they can choose to contribute to the union but are not required to do so as a condition of
employment. Id.
8.
See Schumb, supranote 6, at 911-12 (noting that in private employment, while closed shops had been
prohibited in 1947, union shops, maintenance of membership agreements, and agency shops each had been
validated by 1963); Foster, supra note 5,at 1106 (noting that in public employment, while all jurisdictions
prohibit closed shops, several jurisdictions permit agency shops, and some authorize union shops and
maintenance-of-membership provisions).
9.
See CAL Gov'T CODE § 3502.5(a) (West 1995) (authorizing agency shops for most local public
employees); id. § 3515.7(a) (West 1995) (authorizing agency shops for most State employees); id. §§ 3540.1(i)(2),
3546 (West 1995) (authorizing agency shops for most public education employees).
10. Id. 88 3560-3599 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
11. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON HIGHER EDUCATION, COMM1TTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 645, at 3 (June 29,

1999).
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3583.5 (enacted by Chapter 952); see ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON HIGHER
EDUCATION, COMMrrTEE ANALYsIs OF SB 645, at 4 (June 29, 1999) (indicating that critics of the legislation note
that statutorily imposed agency shop arrangements are unprecedented in California's public sector).
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3583.5 (enacted by Chapter 952). "Fair share service fee" is synonymous with
"agency shop fee" and "fair share fee." See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON HIGHER EDUCATION, COMMTEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 645, at 3 (June 29, 1999) (indicating that SB 645 addresses the issue of"agency shop/fair share
fees").
14. Infra Part l.
15. Infra Parts lll, IV.
16. See infra Part IV.F (suggesting that decertifying an employee organization may be easier than
defeating the agency shop arrangement imposed by Chapter 952).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The perceived need for agency shop arrangements arises from the law's
requirement that an employee organization acting as the exclusive representative
of a bargaining unit must fairly represent all employees in the bargaining unit,
whether or not those individual employees wish to be represented by the
organization.' 7 The legal duty of a union to fairly represent all members of a
bargaining unit, and not just union members, was established 8 in 1944 with the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.19
Today, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 20 codifies the duty of an exclusive

employee organization to represent nonunion members in a bargaining unit.21 The
NLRA does not, however, apply to government employees.' Instead, state law and
the federal Constitution govern the collective bargaining rights of these public

employees.'
California law recognizes important distinctions between public and private
employees, resulting in public employees being denied the common law collective
bargaining rights that exist for private employees. 24 One important distinction is that
the incentive to oppress labor that exists in the private sector is largely absent in the
public sector. Two other distinctions justify the absence of common law collective
bargaining rights for public employees.26 First, the public interest in the

uninterrupted performance of government functions requires that public employees

17. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,220-22 (1976) (noting that in carrying out its
collective bargaining duties under federal labor law, an exclusive representative "is obliged 'fairly and equitably
to represent all employees[,] ...
union and non-union,' within the relevant unit," that such responsibility requires
the expendiure of time and money, and that employee organizations seek to compel nonunion employees to share
in this expense) (quoting Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,761 (1961)).
18. See Reynolds Testimony, supra note 1, at 5 (indicating that Steele represented the first recognition of
this obligation).
19. 323 U.S. 192 (1944); see id.at 199 (holding that the Railway Labor Act's use of the word
"representative" implied that the union "is to act on behalf of all employees which, by virtue of the statute, it
undertakes to represent").
20. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-1169 (West 1988 and 1994).
21. Id. § 159(a) (West 1994).
22. Id. § 152(2) (West 1988) (excepting government from the definition of "employer" in the Act); see
also NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 821 F.2d 328, 331-32 (6th Cir. 1987) (indicating that "[p]ublic
employees are not governed by the federal labor laws").
23. Greg W. Pearman, Public Employee Bargaining Rights: An Avenue for Successfor the Majorty or a
Trapfor the Minority?, 1994 J. DISP. REsOL. 301,303 (1994).
24. See, e.g., Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 298, 168 P.2d 741, 745 (1946)
(indicating that public employees do not have the same bargaining rights as private employees); City of Los
Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36,49,210 P.2d 305,313 (1949) (same).
25. See Nutter, 74 Cal. App. 2d at 298, 168 P.2d at 744-45 (suggesting that the incentive for personal gain
that exists inthe private sector but not in the public sector results in a disregard for the welfare of employees).
26. See Los Angeles Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d at 49, 210 P.2d at 313 (indicating
that certain civil rights are sacrificed by government employees because of two significant differences between
private and public employees).
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sacrifice certain civil rights. 27 Also, the fair treatment of public employees is, to a

considerable extent, compelled by law.2 Therefore, except as29may be authorized by
law, public employees have no right to bargain collectively.
A.

The Evolution of Public Employee BargainingRights in California
1. The Brown and Winton Acts

In 1961, landmark legislation intended to improve employer-employee relations
in California's public agencies gave public employees the right to join employee
organizations for the purpose of representation in matters related to employment

conditions. 30 Known as the Brown Act,31 this legislation applied to nearly all nonfederal government agencies within the State and their employees.3 2 Employees

elected by popular vote or appointed to their positions by the Governor were
expressly exempted from the Act, and the legislation allowed public agencies to

exempt law
enforcement positions from coverage when doing so was in the public
33

interest.
In addition to allowing public employees to join employee organizations, the

Brown Act also provided employees covered under the Act with the right to refuse
to join an organization and to represent themselves individually.34 The Brown Act,

however, fell short of providing employee organizations with anything more than
an advisory role in establishing employment terms.35 The Act merely required

public agency employers to reasonably consider the recommendations of employee
organizations in establishing employment policy. 36 It did not contemplate the
negotiation of collective bargaining agreements between employee organizations
and public agencies.37 The Brown Act also contained no reference to exclusive

27. ld.,210 P.2dat313.
28. Id., 210 P.2d at 313.
29. City of Hayward v. United Pub. Employees, Local 390,54 Cal. App. 3d 761,763,126 Cal. Rptr. 710,
711 (1976).
30. 1961 Cal. Stat. ch. 1964, sec. 1, at 4141-43 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3509).
31. Id.; see B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency and Employment § 455 (9th ed. 1987)
(noting that this legislation was known as the Brown Act until it was amended in 1968).
32. 1961 Cal. Stat. ch. 1964, sec. 1, at 4141-42 (enacting CAL GOV'T CODE § 3501(b)-(c)).
33. Id. at 4141-43 (enacting CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 3501(c), 3508).
34. Id. at 4142 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3502).
35. See Glendale City Employees' Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 15 Cal. 3d 328,335,540 P.2d 609,614, 124
Cal. Rptr. 513,518 (1975) (indicating that the George Brown Act "provided only that management representatives
should listen to and discuss the demands of the unions").
36. 1961 Cal. Stat. ch. 1964, sec. 1,at 4142 (enacting CAL GOV'T CODE § 3505).
37. See Pacific Legal Found. v.Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 168, 176,624 P.2d 1215, 1219, 172 Cal. Rptr. 487,491
(1981) (noting that the Brown Act did not obligate an employer or employee to attempt to reach agreement on
employment terms and did not provide explicit authority to reach binding agreements).
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representation of bargaining units by a single representative organization or to
agency shop arrangements.3 8

Public school employees were removed from the framework of the Brown Act
with the passage of the Winton Act 9 in 1965.40 Applying to employees of county
school districts, county boards of education, county superintendents of schools, and

school district personnel commissions with merit systems, 4' the Winton Act was
similar to the Brown Act in most respects.4 2 The Act did contain notable

innovations, 3 including a provision allowing public school employee organizations
to meet and confer with employers regarding educational policy unrelated to
employment terms and conditions. 44 However, like the Brown Act, the Winton Act
did not authorize collective bargaining of employment terms. 45 Employers were
only required to consider the recommendations of employee organizations in
establishing employment policy.
2. The Meyers-Milias-BrownAct

In 1968, the Brown Act was amended by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act
(MMBA).47 The MMBA applies to local public employees, specifically those
38.

5ee 1961 Cal. Stat ch. 1964, sec. 1,at 4141-43 (enacting CAL GOV'TCODE §§ 3500-3509) (containing

no reference to exclusive representation or organizational security arrangements).
39.

1965 Cal. Stat ch. 2041, sec. 1-2, at 4660-63; see 2 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,

Agency andEmployment § 463 (9th ed. 1987) (noting that this legislation was known as the Winton Act).
40.

1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 2041, see. 1, at 4660 (amending CAL GOV'T CODE § 3501) (removing public school

employees from coverage under the Brown Act).
41. See ia at 4661 (enacting CAL EDUC. CODE § 13081(b)-(c)) (defining the types of public school
employees ta which the Winton Act applies).
42. Compare id. (enacting CAL EDUC. CODE § 13081(c)) (excepting employees elected by popular vote
or appointed by the Governor from coverage under the Winton Act), with 1961 Cal. Stat. ch. 1964, sec. 1,at 414142 (enacting CAL GOV'T CODE § 3501(c)) (excepting employees elected by popular vote or appointed by the
Governor from coverage under the Brown Act), and compare 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 2041, sec. 2, at 4661 (enacting
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13082) (preserving the right of covered employees to join employee organizations, to refuse
to join employee organizations, and to represent themselves in employment relations), with 1961 Cal. Stat. ch.
1964, sec. 1,at 4142 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3502) (providing covered employees with the right to join
employee organizations, to refuse to join employee organizations, and to represent themselves in employment
relations), nid compare 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 2041, sec. 1-2, at 4660-63 (amending CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3501 and
enacting CAL EDUC. CODE §§ 13080-13088) (containing no reference to exclusive representation or
organizational security arrangements), with 1961 Cal. Stat. ch. 1964, sec. 1,at 4141-43 (enacting CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 3500-3509) (same).
43. See Grasko v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 31 Cal. App. 3d 290, 301, 107 Cal. Rptr. 334, 342
(1973), overruledon other grounds by City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 123 Cal. 3d 898, 534 P.2d
403, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975) (claiming that the Winton Act was similar to the Brown Act, but that the Winton
Act also contained a number of innovations).
44.

1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 2041, sec. 2, at 4661-62 (enacting CAL EDUc. CODE § 13085) (providing employees

with a right to meet and confer with employers regarding educational objectives and curriculum).
45. Grasko, 31 Cal. App. 3d at302, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
46.

See id at 303-04, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (examining the legislative intent to determine that employces

only had the power to recommend employment policy to public school employers).
47. CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3510 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
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employed by towns, cities, and counties, whether or not incorporated or chartered,
and other government subdivisions, districts, and public agencies.48 After the courts
found the MMBA to be inapplicable to employees of superior and municipal
courts,4 9 the Legislature amended the MMBA to include most superior and
municipal court employees.5 While the Brown Act allowed public agencies to
prohibit law enforcement personnel from joining employee organizations when
doing so was in the public interest, the MIBA disallowed such a prohibition with
respect to certain full-time peace officers.'
Whereas the Brown Act had provided all employee organizations with the right
to represent their members in employment relations with public agencies, and had
required the governing body of the public agency to meet with and consider the
presentations of all employee organizations, the MMBA allows the public agency
employer to deal only with "recognized" organizations. 51 "Recognized"
organizations are those which the public agency has formally acknowledged as an
organization that represents employees of the organization.5 3 Public agencies have
the power under the MMBA to adopt their own rules in determining whether to
formally recognize an employee organization.54 The agencies can adopt such rules,
however, only after they conduct a good faith consultation with the employee
organization, and they cannot unreasonably withhold such recognition.5 5
In contrast to the earlier Brown and Winton Acts, the MMBA contemplates the
negotiation of written agreements between the employee organization and the
employer. 6 The MMBA requires employer representatives and recognized
employee organizations to meet and confer in an effort to reach agreement on
employment matters, and, upon agreement, requires them to prepare a written, but
non-binding, "memorandum of understanding" for consideration by the governing

48.

Id. § 3501(b)-(c) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000). Note that because they were omitted from the definition

of public employees contained in the MMBA, State employees initially remained subject to the provisions of the
original statute. Such treatment was expressly codified in 1971 and continued until the 1977 Dills Act. See 2 B.E.

WrrTKN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency and Employment § 455 (9th ed. 1987) (noting the statutory
coverage periods for State employees).

49. See Sacramento County Employees Org. v. Sacrament County, 201 Cal. App. 3d 845, 849,247 Cal.
Rptr. 333, 335 (1988) (holding that municipal and superior courts were not "public agencies" under the MMBA).

50. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3501.5 (West 1995) (stating that "public employee" under the MMBA
includes employees of superior and municipal courts).
51. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 3508 (West 1995). Note that child support and welfare fraud investigators have
been held not to be "peace officers" under the MMBA, while coroner investigators were held to be "peace
officers" under the MMBA. San Bernardino County Sheriff's Employees' Benefit Ass'n v. San Bernardino County
Bd. of Supervisors, 7 Cal. App. 4th 602, 611-12, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 662-63 (1992).
52. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West 1995).

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. § 3501(b) (West 1995).
Id. § 3507 (West 1995).
Id.
Id. § 3505.1 (West 1995).
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body." The "memorandum ofunderstanding" then becomes binding if it is accepted
by the governing body.58
The MMBA, like the Brown Act, did not originally refer to exclusive
representation or agency shop arrangements. 59 However, amendments to the
MMBA and case law eventually introduced the concept of exclusive representation
and ultimately led to the express authorization for local public employee
organizations to negotiate agency shop arrangements. A 1971 amendment to the
MMBA provides that public agencies may adopt rules for the "exclusive
recognition of employee organizations formally recognized pursuant to a vote of the
employees of the agency or an appropriate unit thereof, subject to the right of an
employee to represent himself." 60 While this provision seems merely to permit
exclusive representation, at least one court interprets this provision 6as mandating
that there be only one employee representative of a bargaining unit. '
The concept of exclusive representation was strengthened in Relyea v. Ventura
County Fire Protection Dist.,62 which rejected an employee's right under the
MMBA to directly bargain with the employer. 63 Because an employer only has a
statutory duty to negotiate with an employee organization, the individual's right to
self-representation does not include the right to bargain over employment terms and
conditions6 4 Thus, where the employer has chosen to negotiate exclusively with an
employee organization, the self-representation right becomes merely the right to
raise personal grievances and vent individual concerns.65
Agency shop arrangements initially were found to be invalid under the
provisions of the MMBA. 66 In City of Hayward v. United Pub. Employees, Local
390, of Serv.Employee Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 67 the city and the union entered into
a "memorandum of understanding" which recognized the union as representing a

57. Id. §§ 3505-3505.1.
58. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. County of San Diego, 11 Cal. App. 4th 506,
513, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 55 (1992).
59. See 1968 Cal. Stat. ch. 1390, sec. 1-13, at 2725-29 (amending CAL GOV'TCODE -§§ 3500-3501, 35033505,3507-3508, and enacting CAL. GOV'TCODE §§ 3504.5,3505.1-3505.3,3510-3511) (containing no reference
to exclusive representation or organizational security arrangements).
60.

CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3507 (West 1995).

61.

Placentia Local Fire Fighters, Local 2147 v. City of Placentia, 57 Cal. App. 3d 9, 21, 129 Cal. Rptr.

126, 135 (1976). The court indicated, however, that an individual member could still choose not to join that
organization and could bargain directly with the agency. id., 129 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
62. 2 Cal. App. 4th 875,3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614(1992).
63. Id. at 877,3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615.
64. See id.at 880-82, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617-19 (deciding that allowing individual bargaining would be

inconsistent with certain MMBA provisions and the apparent intent of the Legislature). The court expressly
refused to follow the contrary decision reached in Placentiabecause that decision was not supported by any legal
analysis. Id. at 882, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
65. Id. at 883, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
66. City of Hayward v. United Pub. Employees, Local 390, 54 Cal. App. 3d 761,764-67, 126 Cal. Rptr.
710,712-14 (1976).
67. 54 Cal. App. 3d 761, 126 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1976).
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majority of the employees in a particular bargaining unit and required non-union
members of the unit to pay the union a fee equivalent to the amount of union dues
as a condition of employment." The agency shop provision was invalid because it
was inconsistent with both the freedom granted employees by the MMBA to choose
whether or not to join an employee association and the MMBA provision which
forbade a public agency or employee organization from interfering with that right
to choose.6 9 The City of Hayward court considered the forced payment of dues to
be the equivalent of participation in an employee organization, thereby having the
practical effect of inducing union membership on the part of unwilling employees. °
Such coercion is forbidden by law.7 ' The court concluded that union security
devices such as agency shop arrangements were valid only when authorized by
statute.72 Such authorization came in 1981 when the MMBA was amended to
include express authorization for local public employees, with the exception of
management, confidential, and supervisory employees, to enter into agency shop
arrangements. 3
3. The EducationEmployee Relations Act
The Winton Act, which had been severely criticized for failing to provide an
effective means of conducting public education employee-employer relations, 74 was
repealed in 197575 by legislation known as the Rhodda Act or the Education
Employee Relations Act (EERA).76 Like the acts that came before it relating to
public employees' collective bargaining rights, the EERA provides that employees
may choose whether or not to join an employee organization."7 Like the MMBA,
the EERA contemplates the negotiation of written collective bargaining
agreements. 8 Unlike the prior legislation related to public employees' collective
bargaining rights, the EERA expressly calls for exclusive representation of a
bargaining unit by a single employee organization.7 9 Once an exclusive
representative is chosen, an employee can no longer negotiate directly with the

68. Id. at 763, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
69.

Id. at 764, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 712.

70. Id. at 767, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
71.

Id.

72. Id.
73. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3502.5(a) (West 1995).
74. Schumb, supra note 6, at 909.
75. 1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 961, at 2247 ((repealing CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13080-13088).
76. CAL GOv'T CODE §§ 3540-3549.3 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
77. Id. § 3543 (West 1995).
78. See id. § 3540.1(h) (West 1995) (defining "meeting and negotiating" to include good faith efforts to
reach agreements and, if requested by either party, to execute written documents incorporating those agreements);
see also id. § 3543.5(c) (West 1995) (making it unlawful for a public school employer to refuse to meet and
negotiate in good faith with an exclusive representative).

79. Id. § 3540 (West 1995).
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employeran The EERA also codifies the duty of the exclusive representative to
fairly represent each and every employee in the bargaining unit.81 Presumably
because of the exclusive representation requirement and the duty to fairly represent
all employees within a unit, the EERA also includes provisions for organizational
security, including the agency shop arrangement.8 2
The EERA applies to employees of school districts, county boards of education,
and county school superintendents, provided that they are not elected by popular
vote or appointed by the Governor.83 The EERA is also applicable to employees of
community college districts.4 Under the EERA, however, management employees
and confidential employees are prohibited from being represented by an exclusive
representative and from meeting and negotiating with employers.85
While the MMBA allows the public agency employer to establish rules
regarding the recognition of employee organizations, the EERA specifies the
procedure by which an employee organization may become certified as an exclusive
representative of a bargaining unit.86 The certification provisions of the EERA
require proof that a majority of employees in a unit support a particular employee
organization before that organization can be certified as the exclusive
representative. 7 Where such majority support is in doubt or contested, exclusive
representatives may be chosen by election. s An organization must receive a
majority of the votes cast in order to become the exclusive representative, and each
ballot must include a choice of "no representation. '8 9
The EERA established the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 90and
vested in the independent agency the responsibility for, among other things,
determining appropriate bargaining units, conducting elections, certifying exclusive
representatives, and reviewing and deciding unfair practice charges. 9' Later

80. Id. § 3543.
81. Id. § 3544.9 (West 1995).
82. See id. § 3546 (West 1995) (allowing organizational security arrangements); id. § 3540.1(i)(2) (West
1995) (defining organizational security to include agency shop arrangements).
83. Id. § 3540.1(j)-(k).
84. United Pub. Employees, Local 790, v. Public Employees Relations Bd., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 113132, 262 Cal. Rptr. 158, 165-66 (1989).

85. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.4 (West 1995).
86. Id. §§ 3544-3544.7 (West 1995).
87. Id. § 3544.
88. Id. §§ 3544.1-3544.7.
89. Id. § 3544.7.
90. I § 3541.
91. Id. § 3541.3 (West 1995). The PERB was originally known as the Educational Employment Relations
Board. 1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 961, sec. 2, at 2249-50 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541). Its name was changed to
the Public Employment Relations Board with the enactment of the Dills Act in 1977. CAL GOV'TCODE § 3513(h)
(West 1995).
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legislation expanded the PERB's jurisdiction so that it would include collective
bargaining matters involving State employees and higher education employees.92
4. The Dills Act

The Dills Act93 provides most State employees with collective bargaining rights
similar to those existing for local public employees and public school employees.
The Dills Act provides covered employees with the right to choose whether or not
to join an employee organization and allows them to represent themselves
individually. 94 The negotiation process between the employer and employee
organization is to culminate in a written "memorandum ofunderstanding" reflecting
the agreed terms of employment.95 The Dills Act also provides for the recognition
of an exclusive representative. 96 Organizational security in the form of a
"maintenance of membership" provision was authorized under the original version
of the Dills Act. 97 A 1982 amendment to the Dills Act added agency shop
arrangements to the permitted forms of organizational security.98 The Dills Act
applies to civil service employees of the State and the teaching staff of schools
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education or the Superintendent of
Public Instruction." However, managerial, confidential, supervisory, and certain
other employees are expressly excluded from coverage under the Act.1°°
5. The Bill of Rightsfor State Excluded Employees

The rights of those State employees, including supervisors, not covered by the
Dills Act are addressed in the 1990 Bill of Rights for State Excluded Employees."'
"Excluded" employee organizations have the right to represent their members in
their employment relations with the State, and "excluded" employees may also
represent themselves.' 2 However, the legislation expressly compels the State to
meet and confer only with supervisory employee organizations, and the State need
only consider the presentations of such organizations prior to establishing

92. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3513(h) (governing State employees); id. § 3562(b) (West 1995) (governing
higher education employees and indicating that references to "board" in the Higher Education EmployerEmployee Relations are references to the PERB).
93. Id. §§ 3511-3524 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. § 3515 (West 1995).
Id. § 3517.5 (West 1995).
Id. § 3520.5 (West 1995).
1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 1159, sec. 4, at 3753 (enacting CAL GOV'TCODE § 3515).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3515.7(a) (West 1995).
Id § 3513(c) (West 1995).
Id.
Id. §§ 3525-3539.5 (West 1995).
Id § 3530.
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employment policies.1t 3 The Act does not contemplate written agreements.104
"Excluded" employees covered under this legislation are not subject to exclusive
representation provisions, do not have the right to enter into organizational security
arrangements, and do not have access to the PERB in the event of disputes.'
6. The HigherEducationEmployer-Employee RelationsAct
Employees of the University of California (UC), Hastings College of the Law,
and the California State University (CSU) obtain their collective bargaining rights
from the 1978 Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA).'16
However, the HEERA excludes managerial and confidential employees from
coverage.107 Student employees whose employment is contingent upon their status
as students may be covered by the HEERA upon a determination by the PERB that
they provide services unrelated to their educational objectives or, alternatively, that
the educational objectives are subordinated to the service that they perform and that
coverage under the HEERA would further the purposes of the HEERA.' 0 ' The
HEERA does not cover graduate student instructors and graduate student
researchers, while the Act does cover medical housestaff participating in residency
programs owned or operated by the UC.'09 Supervisors, while employees under the
HEERA, are treated separately from other HEERA employees and have more
limited rights.t"0
Under the HEERA, employees of the UC and the CSU have the right to form,
join, and participate in employee organizations for the purpose of representation
with respect to employer-employee relations.1"' These employees also have the
right to refuse to join or participate in such organizations." 2 The Act contemplates

103. Id. § 3533.
104. See id. §§ 3525-3539.5 (containing no reference to written agreements between employers and
employees).

105. See id. (containing no reference to exclusive representation, organizational security, or the PERB).
106. Id §§ 3560-3599 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
107. Id § 3562(0 (West 1995).
108. Id.

109. See Association of Graduate Student Employees v Public Employment Relations Bd., 6 Cal. App. 4th
1133, 1144-45, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 282-83 (1992) (holding that the PERB's decision that providing graduate
students with collective bargaining rights would not further the purposes of the HEERA justified a determintion

that graduate students were not employees under the HEERA); Regents of Univ. of California v. Public
Employment Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d 601,624,715 P.2d 590,605,224 Cal. Rptr. 631,646 (1986) (holding that

the PERB's determination that the educational objectives of medical housestaff were subordinate to their
educational objectives and that granting medical housestaff would further the purposes of the HEEPA justified

their inclusion as "employees" under the HEEIRA).
110. CAL GOVT CODE § 3580 (West 1995) (noting that supervisors have no rights under the HEERA other

than those appearing in sections 3580.3-3581.7).
111. Id. § 3565 (West 1995) (concerning non-supervisors); id. § 3581.1 (West 1995) (concerning
supervisors).
112. Id. § 3565 (West 1995); 1d. § 3581.1 (West 1995).
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written "memoranda of understanding" with regard to employment terms for nonsupervisors, and the selection of one organization as an exclusive representative of
a bargaining unit.113 The HEERA emphasizes that, regardless of the employee's
choice regarding union membership, an exclusive employee representative is
required to "represent all employees in the unit, fairly and impartially."'" 4 Prior to
the passage of15Chapter 952, the HEERA contained no reference to agency shop
arrangements.
Absent clearly contrary legislative intent, agency shop arrangements are
inconsistent with, and prohibited by, statutes providing freedom of choice regarding
union membership. 16 Thus, the failure of the HEERA prior to the passage of
Chapter 952 to expressly address agency shop arrangements had the apparent effect
of prohibiting even voluntary agency shop arrangements involving employees
covered under the HEERA.
B. CurrentAgency Shop Statutes Affecting California'sPublic Employees
1.

The MMBA 's Agency Shop Provision

The MMBA authorizes local government employees in California, with the
exception of management, confidential, and supervisory employees, to enter into
agency shop arrangements." 7 The MMBA requires that agency shop arrangements
satisfy the following criteria: (1) the service fee may not exceed the standard
initiation fee, periodic dues and general assessments of the organization; and (2) the
service fee must be paid for the duration of the collective bargaining agreement or
for three years, whichever comes first. 8 Local public employees who are members
of a bona fide religion, body, or sect which has historically held conscientious
objections to joining or financially supporting unions are not required to join or
financially support any union as a condition of employment." 9 Instead, those with
such conscientious objections may be required to pay sums equal to such service.
fees to a nonreligious, nonlabor charity fund.' 20

113. See id. § 3560(e) (West 1995) (indicating that the selection of an exclusive representative is a primary
purpose of the HEERA); id. § 3562(d) (West 1995) (defining "meet and confer" to include good faith efforts to
reach agreement on employment terms and execute a written memorandum reflecting those terms); id. § 3570

(West 1995) (providing that higher education employers shall meet and confer with the employee organization
selected as exclusive representative).
114. Id. § 3578 (West 1995).
115. See id. §§ 3560-3582 (West 1995) (containing no reference to organizational security arrangements).
116. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text (discussing agency-shop agreements).

117. CAL GOV'T CODE § 3502.5(a) (West 1995).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Existing agency shop arrangements may be rescinded by a majority vote of all
the local public employees in a bargaining unit covered by the arrangement. 2 The
secret-ballot vote may take place upon a request for such a vote supported by a
petition signed by at least thirty percent of the employees in the unit.122 The vote
may be taken at any time during the term of the collective bargaining agreement,
but in no event shall more than one vote be taken during the term.12 The MMBA
does provide, however, that "the public agency and the recognized employee
organization may negotiate... an alternative
procedure or procedures regarding a
124
agreement.'
shop
agency
an
on
vote
The statute also requires a local public employee organization which has agreed
to an agency shop provision to keep an itemized record of its financial transactions
and to make a detailed written financial report, consisting of a balance sheet and an
operating statement, available annually to the public agency employer and the
employees who are members of the organization.'25 No requirement exists for such
organizations to provide this information to nonunion employees
who are required
12 6
arrangement.
shop
agency
the
to
pursuant
fee
service
a
to pay
2. The EERA 's Agency Shop Provision
The EERA authorizes public school employees to enter into agency shop
arrangements. 27 Like the MMBA, the EERA requires that agency shop arrangement
satisfy the following criteria: (1) the service fee shall not exceed the standard
initiation fee, membership dues, and general assessments of the union; and (2) the
fee must be paid for the duration of the collective bargaining agreement or for three
years, whichever comes first.128 The EERA contains an exemption similar to the
one contained in the MMBA, whereby an employee may contribute the service fee
amount to charity instead of to the union. 129 However, an employee may claim the
EERA exemption only if she or he is a member of a religious body whose
traditional tenets or teachings include an objection to supporting unions. 30 Also, the
EERA provides that where an employee with such a religious objection requests
individual representation from the union in a grievance, arbitration, or

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

127.
128.
129.
fee to the

Id. § 3502.5(b) (West 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 3502.5(d) (West 1995).
See id. (requiring that reports be made available only to employers and union employees).

Id. §§ 3540.1(i)(2), 3546 (West 1995).
Id. § 3540.1(i)(2).
Compare id. § 3546.3 (West 1995) (providing that members of religious groups may avoid paying a
union), with id. § 3502.5(a) (providing that members of groups with conscientious objections to

supporting unions may avoid paying a fee to the union).

130. Id. § 3546.3.
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administrative 13hearing, the union may charge the employee for the cost of the
representation.
Under the EERA, each employee organization that has agreed to an agency
shop arrangement must keep itemized financial records and make a detailed written
financial report, in the form of a balance sheet and operating statement, available
annually to the PERB and all members of the employee organization. 32 Like the
MMBA, the EERA does not require that nonunion members of the bargaining unit
be provided with the report. 133 Whereas the MMBA contains provisions related to
votes to rescind an agency shop arrangement, the EERA authorizes a rescission vote
"inaccordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by" the PERB.lM4 The
PERB's rules and regulations regarding rescission votes for employees covered by
to the MMBA provisions regarding rescission
the EERA are, however, very similar
1 35
of agency shop arrangements.
3. The Dills Act's Agency Shop Provision
The Dills Act authorizes most State employees to enter into agency shop
arrangements. 36 Managerial, supervisory, confidential, and other employees
covered by the Bill of Rightsfor State Excluded Employees are not authorized to
enter into agency shop arrangements, however.' 37 Furthermore, the Dills Act
provides that the agency shop or "fair share" fee be used "to defray the costs
incurred by the recognized employee organization in fulfilling its duty to represent
the employees in their employment relations with the [S]tate.' ' 38 Like the MMBA
and the EERA, the Dills Act requires that agency shop arrangements satisfy the
following criteria: (1) the fee shall not exceed the standard initiation fee,
membership dues, and general assessments of the union, and (2) that the fee must
be paid for the duration of the collective bargaining agreement, or for three years,

131.
132.
133.
PERB).
134.
135.

Id.
Id. § 3546.5 (West 1995).
See id. (providing only that financial reports be made available to organization members and the

Id. § 3546(b) (West 1995).
See CAL CODE REGS. tit. 8, §§ 34020-34040 (1995) (requiring, for example, a rescission vote if 30%

of the employees in a unit sign a petition in support of an election, and requiring a majority vote of all employees
in a unit for rescission to be effective).
136. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3515.7(a) (West 1995). The agency shop fee is referred to as a "fair share fee" in
the Dills Act. Id.

137. See id. §§ 3525-3539.5 (West 1995) (containing no authorization for organizational security
arrangements).
138. Id. § 3513(k) (West 1995).
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whichever comes first. 39 The Dills Act's religious exemption provision is nearly
identical to that of the EERA.' 4°
The Dills Act contains provisions relating to the rescission of an agency shop
arrangement by vote that are similar to those that the MMBA provides. 41However,
the Dills Act provides that, in the absence of an alternative agreement between the
union and the State, the PERB is responsible for conducting the vote. 142 Each
employee organization that has agreed to an agency shop arrangement must keep
itemized financial records, and must provide annually a detailed written financial
report, in the form of a balance sheet and operating statement, to the PERB and,43in
contrast to the MMBA and the EERA, to all employees in the bargaining unit.
The Dills Act specifies that the employee organization is to calculate the
amount of the agency shop fees, and requires the State employer to deduct the fees
from the employees' wages.'44 Nonunion employees may demand and receive from
the organization a return of any part of their service fees used by the organization
for activities of a partisan political or ideological nature only incidentally related
to employment terms and conditions. 45 Nonunion employees may also obtain a
refund of any part of their service fee used to fund benefits available only to union
members.' 46 Fees used to cover the cost of supporting lobbying efforts designed to
foster policy goals, collective negotiations, or contract administration are not
subject to such a refund. 47 While the employee organization establishes the
"demand and return" procedure, the PERB may compel the organization to return
48
any fees which it determines to be subject to refund under the above provisions.

139. Id. (referring to the fee amount); id. § 3515.7(b) (West 1995) (referring to the time period).
140. Compare CAL GOV'T CODE § 3515.7(c)-(f) (providing that only members ofreligious groups qualify

for the exemption), with id. § 3546.3 (West 1995) (providing, like the Dills Act provision, that only members of
religious groups qualify for the exemption).
141. See id. § 3515.7(d) (West 1995) (containing the Dills Act's rescission provision); id. § 3502.5(b) (W'est

1995) (containing the MMBA's rescission provision); see also supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text
(discussing the MMBA's rescission provision).
142. d. § 3515.7(d).

143. Compare id. § 3515.7(e) (requiring the employee organization to provide an annual financial report
to the PERB and all employees in a bargaining unit), with id. § 3502.5(d) (West 1995) (requiring the employee

organizatio2 to provide an annual financial report to the public agency employer and union employees in a
bargaining unit, but not requiring the employee organization to provide an annual financial report to nonunion

employees in the bargaining unit), and id. § 3546.5 (West 1995) (requiring the employee organization to provide
an annual financial report to the PERB and union employees in a bargaining unit, but not requiring the employee

organization to provide an annual financial report to nonunion employees in a bargaining unit).
144. Id. § 3515.7(b).
145. 2d. § 3515.8 (West 1995).

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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4. The PERB's AdditionalAgency Shop Provisions
The PERB regulations provide additional procedures for implementing an
agency shop arrangement.1 49 Because the EERA and the Dills Act authorize the
PERB to assist in the administration of agency shop arrangements, the public
education and State employees covered under those acts obtain the additional
protection provided by these PERB regulations. 50 The MMBA contains no such
authorization for the PERB to become involved in agency shop arrangements
between local public employee representatives and local public agency
employers.' Protection for employees covered under the MMBA with regard to
agency shop procedures is apparently 52provided only by the constitutional
constraints on an employee organization.
The PERB's regulations require that nonunion employees in a bargaining unit
who are subject to an agency shop arrangement receive annual written notice from
the employee organization identifying the amount of the service fee as a percentage
of normal union dues, the basis for calculating the fee, and the procedure for
appealing the fee.' 3 These calculations must be made on the basis of an
independent audit which shall be made available to the nonunion employees in the
unit."5 The financial reporting requirements under the EERA and the Dills Act are
supplemented by the PERB regulations which require the reports to include the
fees paid and to identify the expenditures used in
amount of dues and agency
55
fee.
agency
the
calculating
Additionally, the PERB regulations contain detailed procedures for appealing
an agency fee amount and for protecting contested fees from improper use during
the appeal procedure. 56 These regulations require that an impartial decision-maker
evaluate the appeal, that the employee organization bear the burden of establishing
the reasonableness of the fee, and that the hearing costs be borne by the employee
organization. 7 Also, contested fees must be placed in an 58interest-bearing escrow
account until all disputes regarding the fees are resolved.

149. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, §§ 32992-32996 (2000).
150. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3515.7(d) (West 1995) (providing that the PERB shall conduct votes
to rescind agency shop arrangements); id. § 3546(b) (West 1995) (providing that the PERB regulations shall
control rescission votes).
151. See id. §§ 3500-3510 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000) (containing no references to the PERB).
152. See infra Part I1.C (discussing the constitutional protections involved in agency shop arrangements).
153. CAL CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 32992.
154. Id.

§ 32993.
155. Id.
156. Id. §§ 32994-32996.

157. Id. § 32994.
158. Id. § 32995.
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C. ConstitutionalChallengesto Agency Shop Arrangements
Agency shop arrangements have met legal challenges with respect to the federal
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and association, due process, and
equal protection. 59 Thus far, courts have upheld agency shop arrangements as
being constitutional.16° However, particular
aspects of agency shop arrangements
6
are subject to constitutional limitations.1 1
The constitutionality of agency shop arrangements in the public sector was first
examined in Abood v. DetroitBoard of Education.'62 In Abood, the U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledged that compelling employees to financially support their
exclusive bargaining representative interferes with an employee's constitutional
right to free expression and association.' 63 However, insofar as the agency shop fees
are used to finance expenditures for the purpose of collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment, such interference is constitutionally
justified by the government's interest in promoting harmony in labor relations."
However, the Abood Court held that where a nonunion employee objects to the
use of agency shop fees for political or ideological purposes unrelated to collective
bargaining, unions violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments when they use the
fees for such a purpose.' 65 An employee is not required to object to specific
expenditures in order to prevent his or her contribution from being used for
ideological purposes; instead, a general objection to any sort of ideological
expenditure is adequate.66 The Court acknowledged the difficulty, particularly in
the public sector, of distinguishing "between collective bargaining activities, for
which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to
collective bargaining, for which such compulsion is prohibited."' 67 Ultimately, the
Court indicated that "the objective [is] to devise a [procedure for] preventing
compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by employees who object thereto
without restricting the Union's ability to require every employee to contribute to the
cost of collective bargaining activities. '

159. See, eg., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (addressing freedom of speech and
freedom of association); Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 743 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1984)
(addressing due process); Association of Capitol Powerhouse Eng'rs v. Div. of'BIdg. and Grounds, 570 P2d 1042

(Wash. 1977) (addressing equal protection).
160. See Foster, supranote 5, at 1107 (noting that agency shop fees have been held constitutional under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments).

161. See id.(indicating that nonunion employees who object to certain employee organization expenditures
unrelated to collective bargaining are entitled to a rebate of a portion of their agency shop fees).
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Id. at 222.
Id. at 222-27.
Id. at 235-37.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 237.
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The U.S. Supreme Court later addressed both the constitutionality of a pure
rebate procedure and the propriety of using agency shop fees for certain specific
expenditures. 169 A pure rebate approach, where a union collects agency fees in an
amount equal to union dues and then later refunds the portion that it was not
allowed to exact in the first place, is inadequate to protect the constitutional rights
of dissenting employees.1 70 The existence of more acceptable alternatives, including
the advance reduction of dues and the use of interest-bearing escrow accounts,
prohibit
a union from even temporarily committing dissenters' funds to improper
171
uses.

A union may constitutionally use the agency shop fees of dissenting employees
for union expenses that are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of
performing the duties of an exclusive representative. 172 Generally, the costs of
conventions, social activities, and union publications may properly be charged to
dissenting employees. 73 Litigation expenses related to contracts, grievances,
disputes, or other litigation concerning exclusive representation of the bargaining
unit may also be charged to these employees, but litigation expenses not having a
connection with exclusive representation may not be charged to dissenting
employees. 74
The procedure for ensuring the proper use of public employment agency shop
fees is subject to challenge on both First Amendment and due process grounds.' 75
A procedure that makes it likely that some of the money collected from nonunion
employees will be used to support political objectives not germane to the union's
collective bargaining function infringes on the First Amendment-even if the
procedure is not shown to have resulted in improper expenditures.' 76 In addition,
forcing a public employee to support a union deprives the employee of "liberty"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.177 The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment includes the right not to be deprived of liberty without
receiving the procedural safeguards of timely and adequate notice of the impending
deprivation and a reasonable opportunity for a hearing before an impartial
adjudicator.'7 8

Constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments create
different implications for the scope of protection. 179 The First Amendment requires

169. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984).

170. Id. at 444.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 448.

173. Id. at 448-51.
174. id. at 453.
175. Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1,743 F.2d 1187, 1192 (1984).
176. Id.

177. Id. at 1193.
178. Id. at 1192-93.
179. Id. at 1194.
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the establishment of a procedure that will "make reasonably sure that agency shop
fees will not be used to support the union's political and ideological activities that
are not germane to collective bargaining."' 180 The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the procedure ensure that those fees will not be used for "any union activities
that are not germane to collective bargaining, whether or not the activities are
political or ideological."' 8' The procedure must reasonably ensure that the
"deprivation [of an employee's freedom of association goes] no further than is
necessary to prevent the individual from taking a free ride on [the organization] that
182
... is providing services to him as his collective bargaining representative."'
Finally, to remain constitutional, a union's procedure for collecting agency fees
must "include an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt
opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker,
and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are
'
pending. 183

The contention that agency shop arrangements violate equal protection rights
has been dismissed by at least one court. 84 Where each employee in a bargaining
unit may choose either to become a union member or to pay an agency shop fee,
and where each receives equal benefits in the improvement of the terms and
conditions of employment, those similarly situated have been held to be similarly
treated. 35 Accordingly, equal protection rights are not violated.' 86
III. CHAPTER 952
Chapter 952 institutes a mandatory agency shop arrangement for all CSU and
UC employees-other than the UC faculty who are eligible for membership in the
Academic Senate-who are in bargaining units for which an exclusive
representative has been selected.'8 As a condition of employment, affected
employees either must join the employee organization and pay the organization the
standard initiation fee, periodic dues, and general assessments, or must not join the
organization and nevertheless pay the organization an agency shop fee.' 88 The
agency shop fees will not exceed the dues payable by members of the employee
organization, and fees are to be used to cover the costs of negotiation, contract

180. Id.
181. Id.

132. Id. at 1193.
183. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. I v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986).
184. Association of Capitol Powerhouse Eng'rs v. Division of Bldg. and Grounds, 570 P.2d 1042, 1049

(Wash. 1977).
185. Id.
186. Id.

187. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 3583 (amended by Chapter 952); id. § 3583.5 (enacted by Chapter 952).
188. Id. § 3583 (amended by Chapter 952); id. § 3583.5 (enacted by Chapter 952). Note that Chapter 952
refers to the agency shop fee as a "fair share service fee." Id.

590
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administration, and other activities germane to the organization's function as the
exclusive bargaining representative! 9 Agency shop fees may also be used for
lobbying activities if those activities are "designed to foster collective bargaining
negotiations and contract administration or to secure the represented employees'
advantages" in employment terms and conditions!" ° Employers will deduct
employee union dues and assessments or agency shop fees from employee
paychecks.1 91
Employees affected by Chapter 952 who are members of a bona fide religion,
body, or sect that has historically held conscientious objections to joining or
financially supporting unions are not required to join or financially support any
employee organization as a condition of employment. 192 Those belonging to such
a religion, body, or sect instead may pay sums equal to the fair share service fee to
a nonreligious, nonlabor charity fund. 193 The employee must choose the charity fund
from a list of at least three funds designated by the employer and the exclusive
representative or by the employee if the employer and the representative fail to
designate three funds.' 94 In order to retain the exemption from financially
supporting the employee organization, an eligible employee choosing the charitable
contribution option must prove to the employer, on a monthly basis, that she or he
has made adequate payments to the charitable fund.' 95 Payroll deductions for
charitable donations are neither required nor authorized under the Act.196
Under Chapter 952, every higher education employee organization with an
agency shop arrangement is required to keep an itemized record of its financial
transactions and must make a detailed written report, in the form of a balance sheet
and an operating statement, available annually to the employer and the employees
who are members of the organization.' 97 If the organization is required to file
financial reports under the federal Labor-Management Disclosure Act of 1959198 or
under section 3546.5 of California's Government Code,' 99 that organization may

189. Id. § 3583.5(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 952).
190. Id. § 3583.5(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 952).
191. Id. § 3583(a) (amended by Chapter 952); id. § 3583.5(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 952).
192. Id. § 3584(a) (enacted by Chapter 952). Note that, as opposed to the similar provisions in the EERA
and the Dills Act, this provision, like its counterpart in the MMBA, allows members of non-religious groups to
utilize the exemption. Compare id. § 3502.5 (West 1995) (containing the MMBA's conscientious objector
exemption), with id. § 3515.7(c) (West 1995) (containing the Dills Act's religious exemption), and id. § 3546.3

(West 1995) (containing the EERA's religious exemption).
193. Id. § 3584(a).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. (requiring the employee to prove that payments have been made rather than authorizing the
employer to make a payroll deduction).

197. Id. § 3584(b) (enacted by Chapter 952).
198. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-531 (West 1998).

199. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3546.5 (West 1995).
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satisfy the financial reporting requirement by providing the employer with a copy
of those reports.2°
Under Chapter 952, the agency shop arrangement will continue for each
bargaining unit with an exclusive representative unless it is rescinded pursuant to
a vote of employees in the unit.20' The PERB will conduct a secret-ballot election
to rescind the agency shop arrangement for a particular bargaining unit at the
worksite if a request for a vote is supported by a petition. 2° The petition must
contain the signatures of at least thirty percent of the employees in the unit, and
those signatures must be obtained in one academic year.03 In order for the agency
shop arrangement to be rescinded, a majority of all the employees in the bargaining
unit, not just a majority of those voting, must vote for rescission.204 No more than
one vote may be taken during the term of any "memorandum of understanding" in
effect on or after January 2000.205

If the agency shop arrangement is rescinded by election, the agency shop
arrangement may be reinstated by majority vote of the bargaining unit.204 The
secret-ballot reinstatement election will be conducted at the worksite by the PERB
upon the receipt of a request for a vote supported by a petition signed by at least
thirty percent of the employees in the bargaining unit.20 7 No election to reinstate an
agency shop arrangement may occur until at least one year after the rescission of
such an arrangement.208
Under Chapter 952, the cost of elections to either rescind or reinstate an agency
shop arrangement will be borne by the party petitioning for the election. 2" The
employer is to remain completely neutral with respect to any election
and may not
210
participate in the election unless required to do so by the PERB.

200. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 3584(b) (enacted by Chapter 952). The California Government Code contains
specific reporting requirements for recognized or certified employee organizations representing public education
employees. Id. § 3546.5 (West 1995). The federal act requires annual financial reports for organizations
representing private sector employees. 29 U.S.C.A. § 431(b).
201. CAL GOv'T CODE § 3583.5(b)-(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 952).
202. hi.§ 3583.5(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 952).
203. Id. An "academic year" for the UC runs from July to June. See Romano v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 14 Cal.
4th 479, 499, 926 P.2d 1114, 1126, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 32 (1996) (indicating that "the plaintiff worked in the
laboratory fcr the next academic year, from July 1992 to June 1993"). An "academic year" for the CSU is either
two consecutive semesters commencing with the opening of the fall term or any three quarters in a period of four
consecutive quarters, depending on whether the particular campus utilizes a traditional semester system or a yearround quarter system. CAL CODE REGS. tit. 5,§ 42700(v) (1999).
204. CAL GOV'T CODE § 3583.5(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 952).
205. Idl
206. Id. § 3583.5(c)(2) (enacted by Chapter 952).
207. Id208. Id.
209. Id. § 3583.5(c)(4) (enacted by Chapter 952).
210. Id. § 3583.5(b) (enacted by Chapter 952).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 952
A. Arguments Forand Against Chapter952

Whereas employee organizations with exclusive representation rights and
obligations could not even negotiate agency shop arrangements with the UC and the

CSU prior to the passage of Chapter 952, the new law now mandates such an
arrangement." t ' Proponents believe that Chapter 952 is equitable legislation
representing good public policy. 212 They argue that fairness dictates that employees
should not be able to benefit from the efforts of a union without contributing to that
union.2 t3 Proponents also note that prior to the enactment of Chapter 952, only

higher education employees had been denied agency shop contracts-K-12,
community college, State, and local government employees have had the statutory
right to form such arrangements.214 Some even argue that agency fee provisions are
necessary in order to allow unions to provide full and fair representation to all

bargaining unit members.2 t5
Proponents claim that the mandatory nature of Chapter 952 is necessary to
"level the playing field. 21 6 They note that for many years union members have

carried the burden of providing fair representation to thousands of nonmembers." 7
Unions contend that when Pete Wilson was Governor, UC and CSU administrations

211. Id. § 3583 (amended by Chapter 952).
212. See, e.g., Letter from Patrick Hallahan, International Representative, and Shari Jones, Business
Manager, Laborers' International Union of North America, to Senator John Burton, California State Senate (May
18, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that "[t]his is a matter of EQUITY for Higher
Education Employees" because other public employees have the right to enter into agency shop arrangements);
Letter from Jill Furille, Director, Government Relations, California Nurses Association, to Senator Patrick
Johnston, Chair, Senate Committee on Appropriations (Apr. 29, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(indicating that Chapter 952 "is good public policy" because it will strengthen patient advocacy and patient
protection in all the UC medical centers).
213. Memorandum from Judith Michaels, Legislative Director, California Federation of Teachers, to
California State Senate Members (May 19, 1999) [hereinafter Michaels memo] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
214. Letter from Mason M. Warren,Vice President and Regional Manager, Laborers' International Union
of North America, to Senator John Burton (July 24,1999) (on file with the McGeorgeLaw Review); see also CAL.
GoV'T CODE §§ 3540.1(i)(2), 3546 (West 1995) (granting public education employees the right to enter into
agency shop arrangements); id. § 3515.7(a) (West 1995) (granting State employees the right to enter into agency
shop arrangements); id. § 3502.5(a) (West 1995) (granting local government employees the right to enter into
agency shop arrangements).
215. Letter from Sharon Scott Dow, Legislative Advocate, California Teachers Association, to Carole
Migden, Chair, Assembly Appropriations Committee (July 9, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
216. id.; see also Letter from Robert J. Gurian, Legislative Director, California Faculty Association, to
Senator Burton (May 11, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
217. Letter from Robert J. Gurian, Legislative Director, California Faculty Association, to Senator Burton
(Apr. 12, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter Gurian Letter 1].
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deliberately tried to weaken unions and succeeded in reducing union membership. 28
Noting this opposition to union security by UC and CSU administrations,
proponents of Chapter 952 argue that attempting to negotiate an agency shop
arrangement through collective bargaining would prove futile, or that management
would exact "too high a price" at the bargaining table. t9 Some even suggest that
organizational security should not be an issue subject to collective bargaining.220
Opponents of the legislation argue that Chapter 952 eliminates historic rights
of employees and gives unions unfair bargaining advantages." 1 They note that prior
to the enactment of Chapter 952, employees covered under the HEERA could
choose whether to support a union, but that Chapter 952 requires nonunion
employees to financially support unions.m22 Opponents also argue that Chapter 952
unfairly provides unions with a "free" concession on an issue, organizational
23
security, that is traditionally subject to collective bargaining negotiations.
Because Chapter 952 imposes agency shop fees without an initial employee vote,
some claim that the legislation amounts to "stealing" money from employees'
paychecks and "taxation without representation." 4
B. Employees Affected by Chapter952
The agency shop arrangement mandated by Chapter 952 applies only to certain
higher education employees.' Chapter 952 requires that employees of CSU and
UC-other than UC faculty who are eligible for Academic Senate
membership-who are in a bargaining unit represented by an exclusive
representative either join the representative organization or pay an agency shop
fee.226 Presently, no UC faculty members are affected by Chapter 952 because UC

218. Letter from Allen Davenport, Director of Government Relations, Service Employees International

Union, to Ted Lembert, Chair, Assembly Committee on Higher Education (June 15, 1999) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
219. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON HIGHER EDUCATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 645, at 4 (June 29,

1999).
220. See Gurian Letter I, supra note 217 (arguing that "employees should not be asked to trade salary or
other considerations for a negotiated fair share arrangement").
221. Letter from Stephen A. Arditti, Assistant Vice President and Director State Government Relations,

University of California, to Senator John Burton (Apr. 9, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
[hereinafter Arditti Letter].
222. Id.

223. Id.
224. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON HIGHER EDUCATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 645, at 4 (June 29,

1999) (noting that opponents liken agency shop fees to taxation without representation); Kenneth R. Weiss, Union
Dues Bill Angers Cal State Professors, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1999, at A3 (reporting that one CSU employee
likened agency shop fees to stealing from employees' paychecks).

225. See CAL GOV'TCODE § 3583.5(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 952) (indicating that only certain employees
are subject to the agency shop arrangement).
226. Id
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faculty members are not currently in a collective bargaining unit.2 7 Chapter 952
will apply, however, to approximately 93,000 employees of the UC and CSU
systems who are represented by unions. 228 Only about twenty-one percent of these
employees are currently union members; the remaining 74,000 will be forced to
choose whether to join the union and pay dues or remain a nonunion employee and
pay an agency shop fee.22

The applicability of Chapter 952, and, in fact, the applicability of any labor
relations laws, to the UC is unclear.m The UC is constitutionally autonomous, and
the provisions of Chapter 952 may not apply to it unless its Board of Regents adopts
Chapter 952's provisions by resolution.2Y However, when the HEERA was enacted
in 1978, the UC Regents agreed to adhere to its provisions and not challenge its
constitutionality." Whether Chapter 952 will prompt the Regents to reconsider
their position is unknown, but representatives
of the UC have indicated that a
3
constitutional challenge is unlikelyY2
C. Chapter952's Election Provisions

Chapter 952's election provisions favor unions over both management and
others opposed to agency shop arrangements.23 Most importantly, Chapter 952
provides that the mandatory agency shop arrangement may be rescinded only if a
majority of the employees in a unit votes to rescind the arrangement.235 Because
employee turnout is notoriously low at elections, the chances of obtaining such a
majority are slight.3 6
Also, elections to rescind an agency shop arrangement are more restricted by
Chapter 952 than are elections to reinstate an agency shop arrangement.
Signatures on a petition calling for an election to rescind an agency shop
arrangement must all have been obtained in the same academic year,238 while no
such restriction exists for signatures on a petition calling for the reinstatement of

227. SENATE COMMrrEE ON EDUCATION, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 645, at I (Apr. 19, 1999).

228. Weiss, supra note 224, at A3.
229. Id.
230. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON HIGHER EDUCATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 645, at 5 (June 29,
1999).

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Arditti Letter, supra note 221.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3583.5(c)(1)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 952).
Peter Schrag, FairShare: Will Davis Wear His Union Suit?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 1, 1999, at B7.
compare CA. GOv'T CODE § 3583.5(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 952) (containing the requirements for

compelling an election to rescind an agency shop arrangement), with id. § 3583.5(c)(2) (enacted by Chapter 952)

(containing the requirements for compelling an election to reinstate an agency shop arrangement).
238. Id. § 3583.5(c)(1).
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an agency shop arrangement.239 Also, no more than one vote to rescind an agency
shop arrangement may be taken during the term of any "memorandum of
understanding."' 24° While an election to reinstate a previously rescinded agency shop
arrangement is limited in that it may be conducted no sooner than one year after
rescission, no limitation exists on the number241of reinstatement elections during the
term of a "memorandum of understanding."
A more subtle bias of Chapter 952 toward unions involves the cost of elections,
which must be borne by the party petitioning for the election to either rescind or
reinstate an agency shop arrangement.242 On the one hand, an election to reinstate
an agency shop arrangement presumably would be supported by the union
representing the bargaining unit, and the union presumably would have ample funds
to finance the election. On the other hand, an election to rescind an agency shop
arrangement would have to be financed entirely by those employees who petition
for rescission; the employer is required to remain neutral, and generally is not
allowed to participate in the election.243
D. Agency Shop Fee Amounts Under Chapter952
Chapter 952 does not expressly indicate the exact amount of agency shop fees,
and it does not indicate who will determine the amount. 2"4In contrast, the Dills
Act, 245 which applies to State employees, expressly provides that the employee
organization is to calculate the amount of the fees.246However, because the HEERA
provides that the PERB is to administer the Act, 247 it is fair to assume that the
PERB's regulations apply to these issues. Consistent with the Dills Act provision,
the PERB's regulations indicate that the employee organization determines the
amount of the agency fee.24
Chapter 952 and the PERB regulations appear to adequately protect the
constitutional rights of employees by requiring that agency shop fees be used only
to fund those activities of the employee organization that are germane to its
function as a collective bargaining representative, and by establishing adequate

239. M. § 3583.5(c)(2).
240. M. § 3583.5(c)(1).

241. See id. § 3583.5(c)(2) (containing no reference to a limit on the number of reinstatement elections).
242. Id. § 3583.5(c)(4) (enacted by Chapter 952).
243. Id. § 3583.5(b) (enacted by Chapter 952).
244. See id. § 3583 (amended by Chapter 952) (containing no reference to an agency fee amount or to the
party resposible for determining the amount of the fee); id. § 3583.5 (enacted by Chapter 952) (same); id. § 3584
(enacted by Chapter 952) (same); id. § 3585 (amended by Chapter 952) (same).
245. See supraPart II.A.4 (discussing the Dills Act generally); Part H.B.3 (discussing the Dills Act's agency
shop provision).

246. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3515.7(b) (West 1995).
247. Id. § 3563 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
248. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 32992(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
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procedures to challenge the amount of the fees.249 The PERB's procedures call for
a written explanation of the basis for the fee, a prompt opportunity to challenge the
fee before an impartial tribunal, and assurances via escrow provisions to ensure that
agency fees not be used, even temporarily, for unconstitutional purposes.' 0
Chapter 952 provides that agency shop fees may not exceed the amount of
union dues and that the fees may only be used to cover the cost of activities
germane to the employee organization's function as an exclusive bargaining
representative."' Thus, agency shop fees are likely to amount to seventy to eightyfive percent of union dues, which are presently $560 per year for a CSU
professor.252 Despite the limit on the amount of fees, disputes are still likely to
result over whether certain union expenditures can legally be funded with agency
shop fees. 3
Chapter 952 provides that agency shop fees may be used to finance lobbying
activities designed to foster collective bargaining negotiations or to secure
advantages for represented employees other than those secured through meetings
with the higher education employer.2 4 Because public-sector collective bargaining
requires negotiations with the Legislature, courts have held that the use of agency
shop fees to finance these lobbying activities is constitutional. z5 However, agency
shop fees may not constitutionally be used to finance political or ideological
activities unrelated to collective bargaining. z 6
Distinguishing between lobbying efforts that are germane to an organization's
function as collective bargaining representative and those lobbying efforts that are
motivated by purely political or ideological concerns is problematic.257 Some have
noted that, in many respects, the public-sector union is indistinguishable from a

249. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3583.5(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 952) (providing that fees will not exceed

the amount required to cover the costs of union functions that are germane to the union's function as the
bargaining representative); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, §§ 32994-32996 (2000) (providing procedures for contesting

fees); see also supraPart Il.C (discussing the constitutional issues raised by agency shop fees).
250. See CAL CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 32992(a)(2) (providing that the basis of the fee must be provided to the
employee in a written report); id. § 32994 (containing fee appeal procedures); id. § 32995 (providing that

contested funds must be placed in escrow).
251. CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 3583.5(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 952).
252. See, e.g., Sharline Chiang, Unions Seek to Force Faculty to Pay Dues, L.A. DAILY NEWS, May, 6,
1999, at N7 (estimating fees at 85% of dues); Dorothy Korber, BillAdvances to Make Universities Union Shops;
UC, CSUEmployees Would Be Forcedto PayDues, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 27, 1999, at N10 (noting the amount
of dues for a full CSU professor); Senate OKs BillRequiringAgencyShops at UC, CSU, May 20, 1999, available
in Westlaw, AP file (estimating fees at 70-80% of dues).

253. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (noting the difficulty, especially in the
public sector, in distinguishing between activities for which agency shop fees may be used and activities for which
using agency shop fees is constitutionally prohibited).

254. CAL GOv'T CODE § 3583.5(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 952).
255. Champion v. California, 738 F.2d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1984).
256. Abood, 431 U.S. at 237.

257. Id. at 236.
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political party ss Also, contributing to particular candidates or lobbying for or
against particular legislation ultimately may be more important than negotiations
at the bargaining table in achieving a union's goals.2 9 Because unions are likely to
argue that nearly all of their political and lobbying expenditures are germane to
their function as exclusive representative, some nonunion employees fear that their
agency shop fees will be used to oppose proposals which many employees support,
including a proposed merit-based pay system. 2 °
E. Chapter952's Conscientious ObjectorExemption
Chapter 952 provides that members of a bona fide religion, body, or sect that
historically has held conscientious objections to joining or financially supporting
unions may pay their fee amount to a qualified charity rather than to the employee
organization.261 This provision, while apparently motivated by sensitivity to First
Amendment concerns, raises other constitutional issues. 262 Also, Chapter 952's
requirement that an employee choosing the charitable contribution exemption must
prove to the employer-on a monthly basis-that she or he has made adequate
payments to the charitable fund raises the practical issue of enforcement.2 63
1. ConstitutionalIssues Raised by the Conscientious ObjectorExemption
a. Inquiringinto One's Religious Beliefs andAffiliations
Chapter 952's exemption is available only to employees who are members of
a bona fide religion, body, or sect whose traditions hold an objection to supporting
unions. 2 4 Because personal, philosophic, and economic reasons may be behind an
attempt to utilize this exemption, an employee's sincerity in claiming this
exemption may come into question.2 While an inquiry into the sincerity of one's
religious beliefs in itself may be regarded as a violation of the spirit of the First
Amendment's religious guarantees, the courts often undertake such "sincerity

258. E.g., id. at 257 (Powell, L,concurring).

259. See Schumb, supra note 6, at 922 (discussing the boundary between permissible and impermissible
expenditures using agency shop fees).
260. Weiss, supranote 224, at A3.

261. CAL GOV'T CODE § 3584(a) (enacted by Chapter 952).
262. See, e.g., infra Part IV.E.1.a (discussing the constitutionalityof inquiring into the sincerity ofa person's
religious beliefs); infra Part IV.E.l.b.i (discussing Establishment Clause issues raised by the exemption); infra

Part IV.E.l.b.ii
(discussing the equal protection issues-raised by the exemption).
263. See infra Part IV.E.2 (discussing the likelihood of termination as a remedy for an employee's failure

to pay the required fee to a charitable organization).
264. CAL GOV'T CODE § 3584(a) (enacted by Chapter 952).
265. See, e.g., infra note 271 and accompanying text (explaining an economic motive for attempting to
utilize the conscientious objection exemption).
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analyses.,, 26 Distinguishing between beliefs held as a matter of conscience and

purported beliefs motivated by deception and fraud is necessary to prevent insincere
parties from claiming a "religious belief" to obtain unfair benefits. 267 The sincerity

of an employee's claim of membership in a religion, body, or sect that holds a
conscientious objection to supporting unions is, therefore, a factual issue that is
subject to dispute in court between the employee and the employee organization.2 68
b. The Establishment Clause and Equal Protection
Chapter 952's exemption for members of certain religions and groups also

raises constitutional issues involving equal protection and the Establishment
Clause.269 Chapter 952 treats employees in a bargaining unit differently on the basis
of their religious or philosophical affiliations.270 In addition to having the choice to

decide whether to support a union or a charity, employees utilizing this exemption
will receive different, and most likely preferential, income tax treatment in

comparison with those employees unable to utilize the exemption. 27'

266. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (noting that "a state-conducted inquiry into the
sincerity of the individual's religious beliefs" might be perceived by the state as "run[ning] afoul of the spirit of
constitutionally protected religious guarantees"); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955) (indicating
that "the ultimate question in conscientious objector cases is the sincerity of the [objector] in his claimed belief');
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that
courts will investigate a religious adherent's sincerity where a religious belief is asserted).
267. Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984).
268. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 726, 394 P.2d 813, 820-21, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77-78 (1964)
(noting that it is proper for the trier of fact to determine whether a religious belief is sincere and held in good
faith).
269. See infra Part IV.E.l.b.i (discussing Establishment Clause issues); infra Part IV.E.1.b.ii (discussing
equal protection issues).
270. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 3584(a) (enacted by Chapter 952) (providing that members of certain groups
may claim an exemption unavailable to other employees).
271. Compare I.R.C. § 162(a) (1999) (identifying union dues as deductible expenses related to carrying on
a trade), and I.R.C. § 67 (1999) (indicating, by omission, that union dues are a miscellaneous itemized deduction
allowable only to the extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income), with I.R.C. § 170 (1999) (providing that charitable contributions are an itemized deduction limited to
either 30% or 50% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income). Example: An employee with a $50,000 adjusted gross
income, no other miscellaneous itemized deductions, and charitable contributions that do not approach $15,000
would obtain a $500 deduction if his or her $500 agency shop fee is paid to a charity, because the 30% or 50%
limit on charitable contributions is not breached. However, the same employee would obtain no deduction if the
fee is paid to the union, because the fee does not exceed the 2% of adjusted gross income "floor" applying to
union dues.
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i. The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion."27 The framers intended the
Establishment Clause to afford protection against the government's "sponsorship,
financial support, or active involvement... in religious activity." 2" Accordingly,
the Clause prohibits the government from passing laws which "aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another.' ' 74
When a party claims that a statute creates such a preference, the initial inquiry
is whether the law facially differentiates among religions. 275 If a law facially
differentiates among religions, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and will be held
invalid unless the governing body can show that the law serves a compelling
governmental interest and that the law has been narrowly tailored so that the
granted preference closely fits the compelling interest. 6 If no facial preference
exists, a statute may still violate the Establishment Clause if it has no secular
legislative purpose, its principal effect advances or inhibits religion, or if it fosters
excessive government entanglement in religion. 2 " Within these limitations,
however, the government may accommodate religious beliefs without violating the
Establishment Clause.278
No clear consensus exists on the issue of whether religious exemptions like the
one contained in Chapter 952 violate the Establishment Clause. 9 The Sixth Circuit
has held that an essentially identical provision in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) was unconstitutional because it violated the Establishment Clause. t °
While the NLRA's religious exemption provision, like Chapter 952's exemption
provision, did not expressly refer to any specific religion, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the NLRA exemption facially distinguished between religions
because it "exempt[ed] from union membership only those employees who are
members of 'bona fide' religious organizations having the beliefs described in the
statute.' 281 The court held that even if it assumed that protecting religious freedom

272. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
273. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 663
(1970)).
274. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
275. Hemandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680,695 (1989).
276. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1982).
277. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
278. Rowe v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1711, 1726, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 634 (1993).
279. CompareWilson v. National Labor Relations Bd., 920 F.2d 1282, 1287 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that
a religious exemption provision violated the Establishment Clause), with Grant v. Spcllman, 664 P.2d 1227, 1232
(Wash. 1583) (Williams, 3., concurring) (indicating that such religious exemption provisions are constitutional).
280. Wilson, 920 F.2d at 1287.
281. Id. The statute in question in Wilson was section 19 of the NLRA, which provides an exemption from
union membership for those employees who are "member[s] of and adhere to established and traditional tenets
or teachings of a bona fide religion, body, or sect which has historically held conscientious objections to joining
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in the workplace was the compelling governmental interest, the statute would still
fail a strict scrutiny analysis because the statute could be more narrowly tailored to
fit the government's interest by providing an exemption "without regard to
membership in a particular religious organization. 282
In addition to finding that the exemption failed a strict scrutiny analysis, the
Sixth Circuit noted that the exemption provision would also fail the three-prong
Lemon test2 83 reserved for those statutes that do not facially distinguish among
religions.2 The court concluded that the NLRA's religious exemption provision
had the effect of advancing the beliefs of one religious sect over another and
involved an excessive entanglement in religion.2 The court supported its
conclusion that the exemption provision advanced religion by noting that the
provision increases the advantages of membership in the type of religious
organization described in the statute. 2" Because the NLRA's exemption provision
ultimately required courts to determine if a religion historically held conscientious
objections to supporting unions, and because courts are not permitted to interpret
particular religious doctrines, the court concluded that the NLRA's exemption
provision required excessive government entanglement with religion. 2 7
However, a Washington statutem providing a similar religious exemption from
mandatory union support was held not to violate the Establishment Clause.2 9
Justice Williams of the Washington Supreme Court noted in a concurring opinion
that the exemption provision could survive a strict scrutiny analysis. 29 Union
security clauses advance a compelling state interest because they foster industrial
peace, stabilize labor-management relations, and help to avoid the confusion that
results from enforcing multiple collective bargaining agreements. 29' Religious
exemptions to union security clauses also advance the compelling state interest of
fostering industrial peace because they accommodate religious beliefs.292 Justice
Williams went so far as to opine that "any decision striking down religious
or supporting unions." Id. at 1288.

282. Id. (emphasis added). In distinguishing the NLRA provision from a similar Washington statute, the
court found that the Washington statute could be read to allow those with religious beliefs against supporting
unions to claim the exemption even if they were not members of a church. Id. at 1289.

283. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
284. Wilson, 920 F.2d at 1287-88.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1288.

287. Id.
288. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.122(1) (West 1991) (providing that union security provisions in
collective bargaining agreements are acceptable provided that they "safeguard the right ofnonassociation of public

employees based on bona fide religious tenets or teachings of a church or religious body of which such public
employee is a member" by allowing those employees to "pay an amount of money equivalent to regular union
dues and initiation fee to a nonreligious charity" instead of to the employee organization).
289.
290.
291.
292.

Grant v. Spellman, 664 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Wash. 1983).
Id. at 1231 (Williams, J., concurring).
Id. at 1232 (Williams, 1,concurring).
Id. (Williams, J., concurring).
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exemptions would amount to hostility towards religion."2 93 Presumably because the
majority found that the statute at issue could be read to allow an exemption for
those who were not members of any specific religious organization, Justice
Williams did not address whether the statute at issue had been tailored to provide
the close fit between the preference and the government interest required by a strict
scrutiny analysis.2 94

While California courts and the United States Supreme Court have not yet
addressed the constitutionality of religious exemptions in union security
arrangements, these courts have addressed other cases involving religious
accommodations. 295 The California Supreme Court has held that the California
Constitution imposes upon employers a duty to accommodate an employee's
religious beliefs provided that the employer will not suffer undue hardship.296 The
court concluded that this accommodation of religious beliefs promotes equal
employment opportunities for members of all religions. 297 The United States

Supreme Court has held that statutes violate the Establishment Clause when they
require the accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs without containing
an exception related to hardships imposed on the employer or other employees. 298
However, in evaluating a religious exemption to the mandatory support of unions,
at least one court has noted that allowing an employee to contribute to charity an
amount equal to the amount other employees had to pay to the union did not result
in a hardship to the employer.29
If a California court were to apply the rationale that the Sixth Circuit used in
Wilson, Chapter 952's exemption provision would be found to violate the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.?0° Like the NLRA statute
that failed the Wilson court's strict scrutiny analysis, Chapter 952's provision grants
an exemption only to "member[s] of a bona fide religion, body, or sect that has
historically held conscientious objections to joining or financially supporting"
unions and, apparently, not to employees who have a conscientious objection to

293. Id. (Williams, L, concurring).
294. See id. at 1230 (finding that the statute at issue could be read in such a way as to make the statute

constitutional).
295. See generally Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1984) (addressing an accommodation
of religious beliefs in the workplace); Rankins v. Commission on Prof'l Competence, 24 Cal. 3d 167, 593 P.2d

852, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1979) (same).
296. Rankins, 24 Cal. 3d at 174,593 P.2d at 856, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 911 (construing CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 8).
297. Id. at 178, 593 P.2d at 859, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
298. See Thornton, 472 U.S. at 709-10 (holding that a Connecticut statute violated the Establishment Clause
because it allowed Sabbath observers an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath).

299. See McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 696 F2d 34,37-38 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that the exemption would
not require the employer to pay additional wages and that no other employees would be rdversely affected to
support the conclusion that no hardship to the employer had been shown).
300. See Wilson v. National Labor Relations Bd., 920 F.2d 1282, 1286-88 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying both
a strict scrutiny analysis and the three-prong test in reaching the conclusion that the religious exemption provision
at issue was unconstitutional).
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supporting a union, but are not members of such a religion, body, or sect.3"'

Chapter 952's exemption provision could also be found to impermissibly advance
religion and involve an excessive entanglement with religion for the same reasons
cited by the Wilson court in its analysis of the NLRA exemption provision.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Wilson, however, appears to represent an
30 3
isolated viewpoint with respect to religious accommodations and exemptions.

Other cases suggest that Chapter 952's exemption provision would be considered

a constitutional accommodation of religious beliefs. 3 4 In the absence of the

exemption provision, Chapter 952 might require those who conscientiously object
to supporting unions to choose between honoring their religious beliefs and keeping

their jobs.30 5 Therefore, without the exemption, Chapter 952 itself might be
considered an impermissible inhibition of religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause. 306 Also, the duty imposed by both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the

California Constitution to reasonably accommodate religious beliefs would support
a decision upholding the exemption, especially if the burden imposed on employers
is less than severe.3°7

301. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3584(a) (enacted by Chapter 952) (providing an exemption for those
employees who are members of organizations that hold certain beliefs, but failing to indicate whether those
employees who hold those same beliefs but are not members of an organization are entitled to the exemption).
The Wilson court suggested that the NLRA provision might have survived a strict scrutiny analysis had it been
drawn to provide the exemption to those who held a conscientious objection to unions but were not members of
any group. Wilson, 920 F.2d at 1287.
302. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3584(a) (enacted by Chapter 952) (providing the exemption for members of
religious groups with a history of objecting to union support); Wilson, 920 F.2d at 1287-88 (noting that where a
statute increases the advantages of membership in particular religions, there may be an advancement of religion,
and also noting that where courts must inquire into a religion's history and doctrine, there may be an excessive
entanglement in religion).
303. See 134 A.L.R. FED. 1 (1996) (referring to several cases that found no constitutional flaw in religious
exemptions to union support and noting Wilson as the exception).
304. See, e.g., Grant v. Spellman, 664 P.2d 1227, 1231-32 (Wash. 1983) (Williams, J. concurring) (finding
that such exemptions can survive strict scrutiny); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1984)
(holding a statutorily mandated accommodation unconstitutional because it made no exceptions for potential
hardships); Rankins v. Commission on Prof'l Competence, 24 Cal. 3d 167, 178, 593 P.2d 852, 859, 154 Cal. Rptr.
907, 914 (1979) (finding that religious accommodations should be made so long as they do not impose under
hardship).
305. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 3583.5 (enacting Chapter 952) (providing that as a condition of continued
employment, an employee shall either join a union or support a union with the payment of a fair share fee); Grant,
664 P.2d at 1232 (noting that exemption provisions prevent employees from being placed in the position of
"having to choose between religious beliefs and employment").
306. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (indicating that a statute may violate the Establishment
Clause if it either advances or inhibitsreligion).
307. See McDaniel v. Essex Int'l Inc., 696 F.2d 34, 37-38 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding that allowing a
charitable contribution in lieu of union support did not involve an unconstitutional application of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act because it did not unduly burden the employer); supra notes 296 and 298 and
accompanying text (noting the California Supreme Court's and United States Supreme Court's holdings which
call for the accommodation of religious beliefs where no hardship results).
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ii. Equal Protection
Equal protection traditionally requires that a government action provide for

uniform treatment of those similarly situated. 3 8 The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not, however, require "absolute equality or precisely

equal advantages" 3°9 under the law, and it does not prohibit every minor difference
in the application of laws to different groups.1 Instead, only classifications which

are invidious, arbitrary, or irrational violate the Equal Protection Clause. 311

Most statutes are valid under the Equal Protection Clause if they contain
classifications that "rationally further a legitimate state interest., 312 However,
statutes which involve suspect classifications, such as those based on race, alienage,
or ancestry, or which interfere with fundamental rights, such as the right to vote,

travel, or procreate, are subject to strict scrutiny.313 The strict scrutiny analysis

requires that a statute be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest in
order to withstand an equal protection challenge.1 4 The U.S. Supreme Court has

suggested that a classification is suspect, and thus subject to heightened scrutiny,
where the class has been "saddled with .. .disabilities, . .. subjected to a
... history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to... a position of
' 31 5
political powerlessness.
Chapter 952's exemption provision involves a classification according to
membership status in particular religions or groups. 6 The free exercise of religion
is a fundamental right. 17 However, because the religious exemption provision of
Chapter 952 accommodates religious beliefs and imposes only an incidental harm

308. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
309. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973).
310. See id.
at 24 (indicating that absolute equality is not required); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30
(1968) (indicating that the Constitution is not violated by every minor difference in treatment).
311. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 967 (1982).
312. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
313. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (noting that strict scrutiny
applies where a statue interferes with a fundamental right or disadvantages a suspect class); id. at 312 n.3 (noting
that the U.S. Supreme Court had held the rights to vote, travel, and procreate to be fundamental rights); id. at 312
n.4 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had held classifications based on race, alienage, and ancestry to be
suspect). Quasi-suspect classifications, including those based on sex, have been subjected to an intermediate
standard of review that requires the classification to be substantially related to a legitimate state interest in order
to withstand an equal protection challenge. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cent., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41
(1985). In practice, though, the difference between this intermediate standard and strict scrutiny may be illusory
because, at least with regard to sex classifications, the U.S. Supreme Court has required states to show
"exceedingly persuasivejustification" for such classifications. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
314. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,217 (1982).
315. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28.
316. CAL GOV'T CODE § 3584(a) (enacted by Chapter 952).
317. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974).
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on those who are unable to claim the exemption, courts are unlikely to consider the
exemption to constitute an interference with the free exercise of religion." 8
The exemption provision discriminates against those employees in a bargaining
unit who are not members of a religion or group which has historically held a
conscientious objection to supporting unions. 319However, courts are very unlikely
to consider the class to be one that has been saddled with disabilities, subjected to
a history of unequal treatment, or relegated to a position of political
powerlessness.32° Furthermore, in at least one case, classifications based on one's
status as a conscientious objector were held not to be suspect. a2t In a few cases,
however, courts have suggested that classifications based on religion are suspect
classifications for the purposes of an equal protection analysis.3"
A religious exemption does address the compelling state interests of
maintaining industrial peace and providing equal employment opportunity among
different religions. 32 Because this purpose is rational and not arbitrary, the
exemption probably would survive the rational basis analysis that would apply if
the provision is found not to contain a suspect classification or interfere with a
fundamental right. 324 However, if Chapter 952's exemption provision is found to
contain a suspect classification or to interfere with a fundamental right, the
provision might be declared unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. 325 The
Sixth Circuit's decision in Wilson indicates that Chapter 952's exemption provision
is not drawn narrowly enough to survive a strict scrutiny analysis because it
provides an exemption only to members of a bona fide religious group and not to
objectors who are not members of such a group.326 However, as mentioned above
in the Establishment Clause analysis, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Wilson appears

318. See id. at 384-85 (noting that where a substantial government interest exists, incidental burdens may
be placed on one's exercise of religion without violating fundamental rights).
319. See supra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages obtained by those employees

who qualify for the exemption).
320. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28 (suggesting that "large, diverse, and amorphous
classies]" are unlikely to be considered suspect).
321. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,375 n.14 (1974) (deciding that conscientious objectors to war

are not members of a suspect class).
322. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (listing religion as a suspect
classification).

323. See supra notes 292 and 297 and accompanying text (noting the opinions of two courts which
addressed the compelling state interest issue).

324. See supranote 312 and accompanying text (explaining the rational basis standard).
325. See supra notes 300-02 and accompanying text (applying the strict scrutiny analysis utilized by the
Sixth Circuit in Wilson to Chapter 952's exemption provision).
326. See supra note 282 and accompanying text (noting that the Sixth Circuit held that the NLRA's
exemption provision was not tailored narrowly enough to survive strict scrutiny). Note that this under-

inclusiveness might also result in the provision's being held unconstitutional under the intermediate standard of
review that is applied to quasi-suspect classifications such as those based on sex. See supranote 313 (discussing
the intermediate standard of review).
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to represent an isolated viewpoint on the issue of religious exemptions and
accommodations.327
While some doubt exists as to the constitutionality of Chapter 952's exemption
provision, similar exemptions in the MMBA, Dills Act, and EERA have not, to
date, been held unconstitutional.328 Also, if the exemption is held to be
unconstitutional, a severability provision in the HEERA will allow the remainder
of the legislation to survive.329

2. Enforcement of the Conscientious ObjectorExemption
Whether an employee may be terminated or sued for failure to make the
required charitable contributions are other issues which Chapter 952's exemption
provision raises.330 While Chapter 952 requires that union dues and agency shop
fees being paid to an employee organization be deducted from paychecks by the
employer, payroll deductions for charitable contributions are neither required nor
authorized by Chapter 952.331 Instead, an eligible employee making charitable
contributions in lieu of paying agency shop fees to a union must prove to the
employer each month that adequate payments have been made to the charitable
fund.332 While Chapter 952 indicates that payment of either dues or fees is a
condition of employment,333 the failure of an employee to make charitable
contributions will not necessarily result in employment termination. 4 The phrase
"condition of continued employment" is merely the statutory language used to
acknowledge an agency shop authorization, and termination upon nonpayment of
fees is only one possible remedy obtainable
for an agency shop violation. 335 Civil
336
lawsuits are another possible remedy.

327. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (acknowledging that Wilson is an isolated decision).

328. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 3502.5(a) (West 1995) (providing the religious exemption for agency shop
arrangements under the MMBA); id. § 3546.3 (West 1995) (providing the religious exemption for agency shop

arrangements under the EERA); id. § 3515.7(e), (f) (West 1995) (providing the religious exemption for agency
shop arrangements under the Dills Act).

329. 1999 Cal. Stat. ch. 952, sec. 5.
330. See Schumb, supra note 6, at 928-30 (discussing problems in enforcing the collection of agency shop
fees).
331. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 3584(a) (enacted by Chapter 952) (requiring no payroll deduction, but
requiring that employees prove that they have made the contribution).
332. Id.
333. See id. § 3583.5(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 952) (providing that paying the fair share fee is a condition
of employment).
334. Cf. San Lorenzo Educ. Ass'n v. Wilson, 32 Cal. 3d 841,846-49,654 P.2d 202,206-08, 187 Cal. Rptr.
432, 436-38 (1982) (evaluating the EERA's organizational security statutes and determining that termination is
only one possible remedy for failure to pay agency shop fees).
335. See id. at 846-49,654 P.2d at 206-08,187 Cal. Rptr.at 436-38 (noting that "condition of employment"
is a"textbook recital of an agency shop authorization" and indicating that civil lawsuits are appropriate remedies).
336. 1d., 654 P.2d at 206-08, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 436-38.
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Some UC and CSU employees appear to be protected against termination by
civil service and tenure laws. 337 For example, CSU employees may only be
terminated for specific reasons, none of which involve the nonpayment of fees.338
Also, because the HEERA does not supersede peer review principles of
appointment, promotion, retention, or tenure of academic employees, CSU
employees are also unlikely to face termination in the event of nonpayment of
fees.339 Finally, as the UC is an independent entity under the California
Constitution, its personnel regulations and policies would likely control whether its
non-academic employees could face termination for nonpaymentY ° Chapter 952
indicates neither that termination is a remedy for the violation of any of its
provisions, nor that its provisions are intended to modify or supersede civil service
laws, tenure laws, or UC regulations. 341 Therefore, while payroll deductions will
ensure that union dues and agency shop fees are paid by those required to do so by
Chapter 952, civil suits may be the sole remedy for employee organizations where
an employee fails to make a charitable contribution as required by Chapter 952.2
E

The DecertificationOption

Those employees who believe that Chapter 952 unfairly favors unions by
removing the initial agency shop arrangement from collective bargaining and by
providing unions with advantages in elections to rescind or reinstate agency shop
arrangements do have one possible, albeit extreme, solution: decertification of their
employee organization as an exclusive representative.4 3 The HEERA provides that
a petition may be filed with the PERB "requesting it to investigate and decide the
question of whether the employees wish to decertify an exclusive representative." 344

337. Schumb, supranote 6, at 928-29.
338. CAL EDUC. CODE § 89535 (West 1989).

339. See CAL GOv'T CODE § 3561(b) (West 1995) (indicating that the -EERA does not supersede certain
existing employment principles).

340. See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (forming the University of California). An analysis of UC regulations and
policies is beyond the scope of this Legislative Note.
341. See CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 3583.5,3584 (enacted by Chapter 952) (containing no express reference to
termination and no reference to Chapter 952 superseding civil service laws, tenure laws, or UC personnel

regulations); id. §§ 3583, 3585 (amended by Chapter 952) (same).
342. See Schumb, supra note 6 at 933 (concluding that civil suits are, after termination and mandatory
payroll deductions, the remaining available remedies to agency shop violations). Because an employee
organization has a strong interest in preventing "free rides," an employee organization is likely to have standing

to sue an employee who fails to make the required payments to charity. See City of Cupertino v. City of San Jose,
33 Cal. App. 4 th 1671, 1675, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171, 173 (1995) (indicating that "[the pivotal issue in standing

is [determining] whether a party has sufficient interest in the issues to ensure the suit will be pursued vigorously");
supranotes 3-4 and accompanying text (defining "free rides" and noting that unions are interested in preventing
"free rides").

343. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3576 (West 1995) (providing the requirements for certification and
decertification of an exclusive representative).

344. Id.
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The petition may allege that an exclusive representative is no longer desired by the
employees in the bargaining unit, and thirty percent of the employees in the unit
must sign the petition.? 5
Because a significant majority of UC and CSU employees who are represented
by an exclusive representative are not union members, decertification petitions may
have the support necessary to compel the PERB to decertify employee
achieves the samee
Decertification acivstes
organizations as exclusive representatives. 346Dcetfcto
result with respect to agency shop fees as does a successful election to rescind the
agency shop arrangement, but it comes without the expense of an election and may
resolve the problem of low voter turnout.-37 Of course, in addition to losing the
obligation to pay an agency shop fee, the employees of a bargaining unit who have
compelled the decertification of their employee organization lose the benefits of
union representation.
V. CONCLUSION

Only an estimated twenty percent of the UC and CSU employees in bargaining
units represented by an exclusive union representative are dues-paying union
members; the remaining eighty percent have benefitted from the collective
bargaining efforts of these unions without any obligation to financially support
them.' Chapter 952 now requires most UC and CSU employees in bargaining units
with exclusive representation either to join the union and pay dues, or pay a fair
share service fee, either to the union or to a qualified charity.349 Chapter 952
therefore marks the end of this "free ride" for approximately 70,000 employees of
the UC and CSU systems.350
Chapter 952 does however represent an approach to public employee collective
bargaining that is new to California.351 In contrast to other California statutes
affecting public employees, Chapter 952 mandates an agency shop arrangement,

345. Id.
346. See Weiss, supra note 224, at A3 (noting that about 21% of those UC and CSU employees represented
by unions are dues-paying members).

347. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 3576 (West 1995) (containing no reference to any expenses involved in
requesting decertification); supranote 236 and accompanying text (discussing low voter turnout).

348. See Weiss, supra note 224, at A3 (noting that only about 21% of those UC and CSU employees
represented by unions are dues-paying members).
349. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3583 (amended by Chapter 952) (providing that joining the union is one
option open to employees); id. § 3583.5 (enacted by Chapter 952) (providing that paying an agency shop fee to
the union is another option); id. § 3584 (enacted by Chapter 952) (providing that in certain situations, the fee may
be paid to a charity).
350. See, e.g., Korber, supranote 252, at N10 (explaining that Chapter 952 affects nearly 70,000 employees
who are covered by union contracts but decline to pay union dues).
351. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON HIGHER EDUCATION, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 645, at 4 (June 29,
1999) (indicating that critics of the legislation observe that statutorily imposed agency shop arrangements are
"unprecedented in California's public sector").
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rather than merely recognizing such an arrangement as an organizational security
device that lawfully may be negotiated between public employers and employees.352

In this way, Chapter 952 seemingly violates the stated purpose of the HEERA,
which is to create "an atmosphere which permits the fullest participation by

employees in the determination of conditions of employment which affect them." 353
While Chapter 952 provides that the agency shop arrangement may be rescinded by
employee vote at any time after its implementation, the election provisions of

Chapter 952 favor unions and make it difficult for opponents of the agency shop
arrangement to mount a successful campaign to rescind the arrangement. M4

Opponents of the mandated agency shop arrangement are also unlikely to have
Chapter 952 invalidated on constitutional grounds.3 5 Instead, the extreme action of
union decertification, which will remove a union as the exclusive representative of
a bargaining unit, may be the only approach for opponents to eliminate the fair
share fees mandated by Chapter 952.356

Barring any widespread drive to decertify unions, Chapter 952 represents a
major victory for organized labor.357 A vast majority of affected employees likely
will choose to join unions and pay dues rather than pay a fair share fee without
obtaining the right to vote on contracts and in union elections.358 This increase in
union membership, coupled with the unions' increased financial strength resulting

from increased dues and the new fair share fees, will make unions a more
formidable force in both the collective bargaining and political arenas. 359 Also,

because Chapter 952 sets a precedent by mandating a union organizational security
device for which individuals traditionally bargained in collective bargaining

negotiations, unions are likely to lobby the Legislature for additional statutory
352. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3502.5(a) (West 1995) (providing that agency shop agreements "may
be negotiated" by local public employee organizations (emphasis added)), and id. § 3515.7(a) (West 1995)
(providing that State employee organizations "may enter into an agreement... providing for organizational
security in the form of ... [a] fair share fee deduction" (emphasis added)), and id. § 3546(a) (West 1995)
(providing that "[ain organizational security arrangement [involving public school employees], in order to be
effective, must be agreedupon by both partiesto the agreement" (emphasis added)), with iL §§ 3583 (amended
by Chapter 952), 3583.5 (enacted by Chapter 952) (establishing mandatory agency shop arrangements for many
higher education employees).
353. See id. § 3560(e) (West 1995) (noting the purpose of the HEERA).
354. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the difficulties involved in attempting to rescind an agency shop
arrangement).
355. See supra Part IVD (discussing the constitutional implications of the amount of agency shop fees
under Chapter 952); supraPart W.E.1 (discussing the constitutional implications of Chapter 952's conscientious
objector exemption).
356. See supraPart IV.F (discussing the decertification option).
357. See, e.g., Kenneth TL Weiss, Union "FairShare" Bill Goes to Davis, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1999, at B2
(noting that unions representing higher education employees will receive several million dollars, the biggest
windfall in their history, with the passage of Chapter 952).
358. Senate OKs Bill RequiringAgency Shops at UC, CSU, supranote 252.
359. See Denny Campbell, Forced Union Dues at UC, CSU is an Effort to Thwart Democracy,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 12, 1999, at B7 (indicating that Chapter 952 might increase union revenues by $10
million per year).
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benefits that
may be difficult or impossible to obtain through collective
360
bargaining.
While Chapter 952 reflects the California Legislature's disdain for the "free
ride" problem that results from exclusive representation and a union's
corresponding duty of fair representation of all employees in a bargaining unit, the
debate over agency shop fees surely will continue. In organizations without agency
shop arrangements, union members will continue to resent their co-workers who
benefit from union representation without paying their share.16 However, in a time
when fewer and fewer American employees believe that unions are necessary to
obtain justice at work, many will see compulsory financial support of unions as
conflicting with the idea of freedom. 62

360. Slee ASSEMBLY COMMITrE ON HIGHER EDUCATION, COMITrlEE ANALYSIS OF SB 645, at 4 (June 29,
1999) (noting the argument that Chapter 952 "may actually serve to reduce employee rights in the long run by
statutorily 'opening the door' to remove key issues from the collective bargaining process").
361. See Michaels memo, supranote 213 (noting the argument that those who do not pay a union should
not be allowed to benefit from the union's action).
362. Reynolds Testimony, supranote 1,at 5.
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